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Abstract
This article explores the innovative use of public procurement as a tool to respect, protect and
promote human rights by capitalizing on the signiﬁcant leverage that public buyers have over
corporate practices in their supply chain. It provides an analysis of Electronics Watch, an
organization that focuses on the role of states’ own procurement practices as central to the
state duty to protect the human rights of those who are affected by its activities as an
economic actor. Through the assessment of the Electronics Watch model this article argues
that by bringing together the economic leverage of public buyers and corporate human rights
due diligence, one can create transformative tools for the improvement of working conditions
in global supply chains.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Public buyers, as large scale consumers of goods, hold signiﬁcant leverage over the
behaviour of brands and retailers in global supply chains. While states tend to use their
discretion to promote domestic social issues through public procurement, this has rarely been
used to inﬂuence conditions of those outside their jurisdiction:1 those working to produce the
goods they purchase. The use of public procurement as a tool for the promotion and
protection of human rights in supply chains is underdeveloped both in theory and practice.
Initiatives for the improvement of human rights in the context of global production
of goods have mainly focused on the responsibilities of the companies involved in
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1 Robert Stumberg, Anita Ramasastry and Meg Roggensack, ‘Turning a Blind Eye? Respecting Human Rights in
Government Purchasing’, ICAR, 2014; Claire Methven O’Brien, Amol Mehra, Marta Andrecka and Nicole Vander
Meulen, ‘Public Procurement and Human Rights: A Survey of Twenty Jurisdictions’, International Learning Lab on
Public Procurement, 2016, p. 20, http://www.hrprocurementlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Public-Procurement-
and-Human-Rights-A-Survey-of-Twenty-Jurisdictions-Final.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017).
the manufacturing and commercialization of consumer products, on the one hand, and
states’ obligations to regulate working conditions under their jurisdiction, on the other.
In the past two decades both these approaches have yielded limited results. Over-reliance
on private power to self-regulate has not brought substantial change to working
conditions in supply chains and the promise of multi-stakeholder initiatives as
alternatives has also fallen short of expectations.2 Equally, the focus on the states
where production is located has had restricted results in the improvement of human
rights standards. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
(the UNGPs)3 have helped to move the debate over human rights in supply chains
forward, establishing a foundation for normative and policy development. They have
also served as an important catalyst for action at state, industry and civil society level,
pushing attention back to the state – especially home states, while still maintaining
expectations of the corporate sector.
This article argues that there are key changes coming in transnational law and practice
in this sector, and it is just a matter of time before states articulate their human rights
obligations in relation to corporate human rights impacts through public procurement.
Initiatives such as Electronics Watch, at the centre of this analysis, contributes to this
trend. The model of the organization is based on providing a platform that harnesses the
power of collaboration and alignment of interests among companies to exercise leverage
in their supply chains. This will ultimately transform such chains through increased
human rights due diligence.
This article provides an analysis of the operational and legal context in which
Electronics Watch has been developed and commenced its activity. It analyses why this
is an innovative approach and points at current implementation challenges that need to be
addressed to make such collaborative models effective as one of many much-needed
solutions to the problems of human rights abuses in global supply chains. Given
Electronics Watch’s initial focus on Europe, this article considers principally the
European Union (EU) normative framework and developments.
II. THE STATE–BUSINESS NEXUS: PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AS A
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS TOOL
Public (government) procurement offers a potentially valuable contribution to the search
for strategies to improve human rights in global supply chains. It can be a powerful
economic instrument to create market demand for responsibly manufactured goods.
Public procurement contracts worldwide are estimated to be worth €2 trillion annually.4
2 See, for example, Richard M Locke, The Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting Labor Standards in a
Global Economy, New York (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Richard Locke, Thomas Kochan and Fei Qin,
‘Beyond Corporate Codes of Conduct: Work Organization and Labour Standards at Nike’s Suppliers’ (2007), 146
International Labour Review; Richard Locke, Ben A Rissing and Timea Pal, ‘Complements or Substitutes? Private
Codes, State Regulation and the Enforcement of Labour Standards in Global Supply Chains’, (2013) 51(3) British
Journal of Industrial Relations 519–52.
3 Human Rights Council, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (Guiding Principles), A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011).
4 European Union, DG Grow, ‘Public Procurement Indicators 2015’, DG GROW G4 – Innovative and
e-Procurement, 10 December 2016.
Governments in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
member states spend on average 12% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on public
procurement5 and an average of 16% in the EU6 and 20% worldwide.7
The UNGPs contemplate states using their purchasing power to promote corporate
respect for human rights. UNGPs 4 to 6 seek to build on the traditional duty of states to
protect the human rights of those affected by third party interference. This is expressed in
UNGP 4 by deﬁning what is referred to as the ‘state–business nexus’. By doing this, the
UNGP increases the focus on a critical role of the state, beyond regulating companies in
their jurisdiction or incorporated in their territory: the state itself as an element of the
production system. While UNGP 4 focuses on state-owned companies, the subsequent
UNGPs 5 and 6 contain direct references to statute duty to protect human rights as
applicable to situations where a state contracts with business entities.8 Generally, states
‘should promote respect for human rights by business enterprises with which they
conduct commercial transactions’ and this includes through public procurement (UNGP
6 Commentary). This Principle therefore can be understood as establishing a link
between the obligations of the state to respect, protect and promote human rights and
public procurement. This has been interpreted as extending a state’s obligations to
protect human rights in its own supply chains.9
The application of socially responsible public procurement for the protection of
human rights, especially regarding the supply chain, is not as straightforward as the
UNGPs may lead one to believe. There are two issues that are recurring general
obstacles. First, the international public procurement regime was created to protect
against anti-competitive practices and discrimination and was based on a narrowly
deﬁned ‘value for money’ concept rather than a system that initially factors in social
considerations.10 Second, the existing practice on socially responsible procurement has
been mostly limited to domestic human rights protection and makes it challenging
to extend social clauses to workers beyond the borders of the buying state.11
5 OECD, ‘Size of Public Procurement Market’ (2011), Government at a Glance, 148.
6 European Commission, DG Trade website, Public Procurement in a Nutshell [undated], http://ec.europa.eu/trade/
policy/accessing-markets/public-procurement/ (accessed 1 February 2017).
7 World Bank Group, ‘Benchmarking Public Procurement 2016: Assessing Public Procurement Systems in 77
Economies,’ Washington, 2016.
8 With regard to services the UNGPs are more speciﬁc, establishing that states should ‘exercise adequate oversight in
order to meet their international human rights obligations when they contract with, or legislate for, business enterprises
to provide services that may impact upon the enjoyment of human rights’. On state obligations and services see, for
example, Claire Methven O’Brien, ‘Essential Services, Public Procurement and Human Rights in Europe’ (2015),
University of Groningen, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2591898## (accessed 1 April 2017).
9 Methven O’Brien, Mehra, Andrecka and Vander Meulen, note 1.
10 The main international instrument on public procurement is the World Trade Organization’s Plurilateral Agreement
on Government Procurement (GPA). The purpose of this international framework is to establish a fair system for
providing goods and services to public authorities through the application of rules on transparency, non-discrimination
and fair competition. The EU is party to this Agreement. Within this framework the emphasis has been placed on the
concept of ‘value for money’, narrowly deﬁned to exclude most social considerations, and the aim of promoting free
trade and competition.
11 Procurement to achieve social aims has been used since the nineteenth century, within the framework of the welfare
state, mainly to achieve horizontal policies linked with domestic employment policies such as ﬁghting discrimination,
promoting local and inclusive employment and manufacturing (e.g., veterans, disabled people and long-term
unemployed). See Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social Justice. Equality, Government Procurement and Legal
Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
This is nevertheless not a barrier for an increasing normative and practice
development on the use of public procurement to articulate secondary objectives
that seek to prevent human rights abuses abroad.12 Current normative developments
seem to be opening avenues for future practice. In the United States, for example,
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) prohibits selling a product sourced abroad
through federal contracts that is mined, produced or manufactured with forced
child labour.13 The UK Modern Slavery Act (2015) requires some public buyers to
report on their efforts to prevent modern slavery, human trafﬁcking and forced labour in
their supply chain.14
Current EU regulation on public procurement does not directly address the issue of
human rights. However, as discussed below, the relatively new 2014 EU procurement
regime provides important opportunities to articulate public procurement as a human
rights mechanism. As a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and signatory
of its General Procurement Agreement, the EU follows the same free trade focused
principles in its regulation of public procurement,15 and whilst the EU corporate
social responsibility (CSR) agenda has attempted to rely on public procurement as a
potential tool to advance human rights protection in the realm of corporate activity,
this is not reﬂected in the procurement regulation.16 The EU current public procurement
regulations are contained, principally, in the Public Procurement Directive (2014/24/EU).17
This regulation is strongly rooted within the principles of non-discrimination and
freedom of competition.
The reforms brought by the new 2014 Directive have increased ﬂexibility for the
inclusion of social objectives as part of procurement processes by including references to
the importance of integration of environmental, social and labour requirements into
public procurement procedures throughout its text, widening the potential use of social
labelling and including requirements to comply with the core International Labour
Organization (ILO) Conventions.18
12 Methven O’Brien, Mehra, Andrecka and Vander Meulen, note 1.
13 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 CFR §101 et seq, at 22.15 (Prohibition of Acquisition of Products
Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labour).
14 Modern Slavery Act (2015), Section 54 Transparency in Supply Chains, etc. This section imposes the obligation on
commercial organizations which turn over a certain threshold (established currently at £36 million) to produce an annual
slavery and human trafﬁcking report. Certain bodies subjected to public procurement regulation are considered to be
commercial organizations for the purposes of Section 54, including most universities.
15 In the framework of the EU, all public sector authorities, whatever the procurement, are subject to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), most signiﬁcantly in relation to rules on equal treatment, freedom of
establishment, and freedom to provide services. This means that at the very least, contracting entities must act
transparently and must treat all bidding parties equally, proportionately and without discrimination.
16 Olga Martin-Ortega and Muzaffer Eroglu, ‘The European Union’s Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy:
a Pole of Excellence?’ in Jan Orbie and Lisa Torrell (eds), The European Union and Social Dimension of Globalisation
(Oxon: Routledge, 2008); Opi Outhwaite and Olga Martin-Ortega, ‘Human Rights in Global Supply Chains:
Corporate Social Responsibility and Public Procurement in the European Union’ (2016) 10:1 Human Rights and Legal
Discourse 41.
17 The Directive only applies to public contracts above the speciﬁed economic threshold, therefore national legislators
are free to regulate public procedures for lower amounts in different ways from those speciﬁed in the Directives, as long
as they comply with EU Treaty provisions.
18 See Olga Martin-Ortega, Opi Outhwaite and William Rook, ‘Buying Power and Working Conditions in the
Electronics Supply Chain: Legal Options for Socially Responsible Public Procurement’ (2015) 19 International Journal
of Human Rights, 341–68; and Outhwaite and Martin-Ortega, note 16.
III. THE COST OF A PHONE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ELECTRONICS
INDUSTRY SUPPLY CHAIN
The electronics industry supply chain is a very complex and multilevel one, as are most
of current global systems of good production.19 Scholar Richard Locke titled one of his
authoritative works: ‘We Live in a World of Global supply Chains’.20 According to
Locke, this world links thousands of companies, ‘large and small, across multiple
cultural and political boundaries’.21 The ILO estimates that by 2013 there were some 453
million global supply chain-related jobs in 40 countries which cover approximately two-
thirds of the global labour force. This represents 85 per cent of world GDP.22 The human
rights of millions of people are directly related to the way these chains are organized and
demand and supply ﬂows through them. This section focuses on the rights of those who
manufacture components and assemble the products.
The electronics industry is heavily focused on its end consumers. International brands
are highly exposed to market demand and dependent on corporate image and consumer
perception.23 ‘Brands’ are well-known companies, with headquarters mostly in
developed countries. They are highly valuable enterprises, with hardware producers
featuring among the highest global revenue producing companies.24 A single product
may contain components involving work carried out by several companies in multiple
countries. Brands themselves tend to carry out little or no manufacturing.25 They
conceive a product, develop essential elements such as software, initiate production and
carry out product design and branding. Complex elements of the electronics goods may
be produced in countries where highly specialized hubs are located but most of the
manufacturing and assembling takes place in low-cost, labour-intensive production sites
in developing countries.26
Component manufacturing and assembly is carried out by contracted manufacturers
which tend, in turn, to be large enterprises themselves, with many employees in
multiple locations, generally in developing countries.27 However, they also
19 OECD, ‘Mapping Global Value Chains’. Report TAD/TC/WP/RD(2012)9, 2012, 27–29.
20 Richard Locke, ‘We Live in a World of Global Supply Chains’ in Dorothee Baumann-Pauly and Justine Nolan
(eds), Business and Human Rights. From Principles to Practice (Oxon: Routledge, 2016) 299.
21 Ibid.
22 ILO, Non-standard forms of employment. Report for discussion at the Meeting of Experts on Non-Standard Forms
of Employment (Geneva, 16–19 February 2015), International Labour Ofﬁce, Geneva, 2015.
23 The electronics industry supply chain extends from the extraction of raw materials to the manufacture and assembly
of products at large factories contracted by global brands and beyond to the management of waste and recycling of
products and components. There are human rights concerns in all of these parts of the chain, with extraction, trade,
processing and transportation of raw materials – including the so-called ‘conﬂict minerals’ – attracting important
attention in the past years. This article focuses only on the upper levels of the supply chain where products and
components are manufactured and assembled.
24 Interbrand, Best Global Brands 2015, http://interbrand.com/best-brands/best-global-brands/2015/ranking/
(accessed 1 April 2017). In this report, the top 10 companies include Apple Inc. (the world most proﬁtable
enterprise), Google, Microsoft, IBM, Samsung and Intel.
25 Locke, note 2, pp 6–7.
26 See, for example, ILO, Ups and Downs in the Electronics Industry: Fluctuating Production and the Use of
Temporary and Other Forms of Employment, GDFACE/2014, International Labour Ofﬁce, Geneva, 2014.
27 OECD, ‘Mapping Global Value Chains’, note 19, 28. FoxConn, Flextronics and Inventec are examples of those.
This is the case in most supply chains. In fact, as described by Mayer and Gerefﬁ, by 2000, 50 per cent of the world’s
manufacturing production was located in developing countries and this trend has only increased over the last decade;
subcontract the manufacturing of speciﬁc components, which form part of the
ﬁnal product.28 These subcontractors, which produce the components and ﬁnished
electronic goods, often employ vast numbers of people to work on their production lines.
A signiﬁcant proportion of this manufacturing takes place in China and East Asia.29 The
extraordinary growth of producing companies, such as Foxconn in China, is built on its
‘cheap, big, fast and efﬁcient production model’.30 China is by far the largest producer of
electronics goods worldwide but electronics factories are also present in many other
jurisdictions, including Mexico, Brazil, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam,
Indonesia, Thailand, India and Eastern Europe –mostly Poland, the Czech Republic and
Hungary.31
The electronics industry is under signiﬁcant consumer and investor pressure to
innovate and to bring new products to the market. This translates into pressure on all
elements of the global supply chain to increase productivity, shrink lead-times and
reduce costs in order to maintain a supply chain ﬂexible enough to respond to peaks of
demand and innovation. At the manufacturing level, this has led to the industry being a
high-risk sector for human rights violations, including forced labour and human
trafﬁcking.32 Manufacturing and assembling is characterized by intensive labour,
demanding a ‘very ﬂexible’ and low skilled workforce able to carry out tiring and
repetitive work – and on occasions, tasks that pose a signiﬁcant risk to worker health.33
The requirement of a ‘ﬂexible’ workforce usually covers up a system in which workers
work without job security or predictability, which would allow them to plan, save and
organize their own family life. This is reinforced by the different domestic legal
mechanisms by which the employer (factory)–employee relationship is undermined in
the industry. These include temporary agency workers, subcontracted workers and
student intern workers.34 In 2016, an ILO study concluded that about 80–90% of the
(F'note continued)
Frederick Mayer and Gary Gerefﬁ, ‘Regulation and Economic Globalization: Prospects and Limits of Private
Governance’, (2010), 12 Business and Politics.
28 Good Electronics, Reset. ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in the Global Electronics Supply Chain’ (2009), 19,
https://goodelectronics.org/publications-en/Publication_3248 (accessed 1 April 2017).
29 Timothy J Sturgeon and Momoko Kawakami, ‘Global Value Chains in the Electronics Industry: Was the
Crisis a Window of Opportunity for Developing Countries?’ (2010), 5417 The World Bank, Policy Research Working
Paper, 4–5.
30 Jenny Chan, Ngai Pun and Mark Selden, ‘Apple, Foxconn and China’s New Working Class’, in Richard P
Appelbaum and Nelson Lichtenstein, (eds), Achieving Workers’ Rights in the Global Economy (Cornell University
Press, 2016), 173.
31 For an in-depth analysis of the companies involved in the supply chain and their roles, see Electronics Watch
(WEED), The ICT Sector in the Spotlight, Leverage of Public Procurement Decisions on Working Conditions in the
Supply Chain, 2014, http://electronicswatch.org/the-ict-sector-in-the-spotlight_723519.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017). In
particular, in relation to Apple, a New York Times study of the iPhone and iPad’s supply chain in 2012 revealed the
following distribution of the production: the software is produced in the USA, whilst semiconductors are produced in
countries such as Germany and Taiwan, memory boards, display panels and circuits in Japan, data ships in Europe and
hundreds of components are assembled in China. Metals are extracted, smelted and reﬁned in countries of Africa and
Asia; Charles Duhigg and Keith Bradsher, ‘How the US Lost Out on iPhone Work’, New York Times, 12 January 2012.
32 ILO, The impact of procurement practices in the electronics sector on labour rights and temporary and other forms
of employment. WP 313. International Labour Ofﬁce, Geneva, 2016.
33 Jenny Chan and C Ho (WEED – World Economy, Ecology, and Development – and SACOM –Students and
Scholars against Corporate Misbehavior), The Dark Side of Cyberspace. Inside the Sweatshops of China’s Hardware
Production (2008), http://electronicswatch.org/the-dark-side-of-cyberspace_3378.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017).
34 ILO, note 26.
workforce in some areas of China, Malaysia, Hungary and Mexico during peak
production periods are temporary contract workers.35 The use of temporary and
contracted labour limits job security, restricts opportunities for advancement, and
often prevents employees from accruing beneﬁts that would be available through
permanent employment.36 In China and the Philippines, certain parts of the industry
have staffed their operations with student labour, interns and ‘on the job trainees’, who in
many instances are not free to choose their employment.37 Workers on short contracts
and students are generally excluded from work beneﬁts and full wages that would apply
to permanent employees.38 Precarious terms of employment, lack of job security
and ﬂuctuations in work demand makes staff turnover high in factories, perpetuating
the lack of access to employment beneﬁts.39 One of the main issues in the industry is the
lack of adequate wages, which in most cases is less than a living wage.40 Routine
overtime – including forced overtime – and excessive working hours are common, as are
pressures on workers’ time due to peaks of demand or shorter time-leads.41
Discrimination not only happens between migrant and local employees, or contracted
and permanent ones, but also along gender lines. Often women are favoured as
employees because they attract lower wages.42 Unionization and collective bargaining is
very low in the industry. In some producing countries this is because protective
legislation is not implemented, whilst in others freedom of association is restricted by
law. Factories also put barriers to association and representation and participation in
strikes or other collective worker organizing activities may lead to punitive action from
the employer.43 Undermining trade unions is a key factor of the ﬂexibility of the
supply chain.
Migrant workers constitute an additional dimension to ﬂexible workforces. Migrant
workers may be temporary agency workers but they also may be core employees. These
workers are particularly vulnerable. They are exposed to exploitation by recruiters, tend
35 Ricarda McFalls, The impact of procurement practices in the electronics sector on labour rights and temporary and
other forms of employment, International Labour Ofﬁce, Geneva, 2016.
36 A Ferus-Comelo and P Pöyhönen. (Finnwatch, Cividep and SOMO), Phony Equality: Labour standards of mobile
phone manufacturers in India, 2011, http://electronicswatch.org/phony-equality_3565.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017).
37 Danwatch, Servants of Servers, Rights Violations and Forced Labour in the Supply Chain of ICT Equipment in
European Universities, 2015, https://www.danwatch.dk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Servants-of-servers.-Danwatch-
Investigation.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017); Electronics Watch, Regional Risk Assessment: Semiconductor and
Electronics Industry, Philippines, December 2016 and Electronics Watch, Regional Risk Assessment: Semiconductor
and Electronics Industry, China, October 2016, http://electronicswatch.org/en/publications-by-electronics-watch_1633
(accessed 25 September 2017).
38 Chan and Ho, note 33; Danwatch, note 37; China Labor Watch, An Investigation of Eight Samsung Factories in
China: Is Samsung Infringing upon Apple’s Patent to Bully Workers?, 2012, http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/report/64
(accessed 1 April 2017).
39 Kakuli and Schipper (SOMO and Swedwatch and Global Standards), Out of Focus: Labour Rights in Vietnam’s
Digital Camera Factories, 2011, http://electronicswatch.org/out-of-focus_3571.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017); China
Labour Watch, note 27.
40 Ferus-Comelo and Pöyhönen, note 36; Kakuli and Schipper, note 39; Chan and Ho, note 33.
41 China Labor Watch, note 38.
42 Kakuli and Schipper, note 39; Chan and Ho, note 33. A growing share of those employed in global supply chains are
women, particularly as a percentage of supply chain workers in emerging economies, ILO Non-Standard Forms,
note 22.
43 Annita Chan, ‘Organizing Wal-Mart in China: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back for China’s Unions’ (2007) 16
New Labor Forum 86–96; Chan and Ho, note 33; Ferus-Comelo and Pöyhönen, note 36.
to be more willing to tolerate exploitative practices in workplaces and are less inclined or
have less opportunities to be organized in trade unions.44 The fact that they are newly
arrived, may not know the language, do not know their rights and do not have a social
network of support means that they are less likely to assert their rights and oppose
abusive labour practices. For example, in 2014 the organization Verité uncovered that
nearly a third of migrant workers in Malaysia’s electronics sector were in a situation of
forced labour, trapped by burdensome debt owed to recruitment agents and deprived of
accesses to their identity documents.45
Working conditions in the factories tend to be poor. Strict rules for employees apply, with
inadequate time for rest or meal breaks and punitive sanctions for breaches of these rules
reported.46 Several parts of the manufacturing process involve exposure to hazards,
especially chemicals, on many occasions without the right protective equipment.47 Living
conditions are also an important concern in the industry. While some workers have to
commute long distances, others are provided accommodation – or required to live – in
factory premises. Workers have been found to live in poor-quality, overcrowded
accommodation in order to reduce their own expenditure.48 Factory-provided
accommodationmay also be overcrowded and lacking adequate standards of habitability. 49
The structural organization of the electronics supply chain means that the brands or
main retailers that sell their products to public authorities are typically not in a direct
contractual relationship with the employees of their suppliers or with subcontractors, and
may, willingly or unwillingly, be oblivious to the human rights abuses impacting the
workers who produce the goods they sell. This should not be a deterrent for companies to
take responsibility over the wellbeing of those workers, especially as companies embrace
the UNGPs, which extend the responsibility to protect human rights through the whole
business activities and partnerships of a company. Even if electronics brands – and the
industry as a whole50 – have made signiﬁcant efforts in the past years to assume
corporate social responsibilities, product suppliers have not assumed equivalent
responsibilities in relation to their subcontractors and manufacturers.
Cascading social commitments tends to be easier said than done. Also, as Berliner and
his co-authors assert, brands are often sending mixed signals to suppliers by asking them
to both compete on price and simultaneously raise labour standards.51 This is where a
new approach is taking off: enlisting public (government) buyers into this responsibility
as well. The next section explores this relationship between the government buyer and
44 Tim Pringle, ‘Reﬂections on Labor in China: From aMoment to a Movement’ (2013) 112 South Atlantic Quarterly;
Chan and Ho, note 33; China Labor Watch, note 38.
45 Verité, Forced Labor in the Production of Electronic Goods in Malaysia. A Comprehensive Study of Scope and
Characteristics, 2014, http://www.verite.org/research/electronicsmalaysia (accessed 1 April 2017).
46 Chan and Ho, note 33.
47 Kakuli and Schipper, note 39.
48 Ferus-Comelo and Pöyhönen, note 36.
49 Ngai Pun and Jenny Chan, ‘Global Capital, the State, and Chinese Workers: The Foxconn Experience’ (2012) 38
Modern China, 383.
50 Together with individual company initiatives, industry associations such as the Electronic Industry Citizenship
Coalition (EICC) are making efforts to raise the social and environmental standards in the supply chain, see www.
eiccoalition.org.
51 Daniel Berliner, Anne Regan Greenleaf, Milli Lake, Margaret Levi and Jennifer Noveck, Labor Standards in
International Supply Chains. Aligning Rights and Incentives (Edward Elgar, 2015), 22.
the larger electronics brands as sellers, and how Electronics Watch is attempting to bring
together these actors, interests and responsibilities.
IV. IMPROVING THE ELECTRONICS SUPPLY CHAIN FOR WORKERS
THROUGH PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
Involving those who use public funds to purchase goods into ethical buying decision
making and processes is not new. In the United States, university and college students have
led the way for years, from boycotting commercial relationships with apartheid South
Africa, demanding the cut of links with companies producing in Burma, and lobbying
administrators to rejecting sweatshop apparel in university merchandise. In the early 2000s,
theWorker Right’s Consortium (WRC) was one of the ﬁrst organizations to link the buying
power of universities to improving working conditions in faraway factories in the garment
sector (albeit not technically regarding procurement, but university licensing).
Today, the WRC supports 175 educational institutions in the USA.52 This is focused
on the garment sector, as are most existing initiatives. Individual public bodies in the
USA and Europe have also attempt to pursue ethical purchasing over the years; however,
most of the existing initiatives have been very localized, with limited capacity to
transform the sector.53 Therefore, the experience so far is rather limited.
Based in Europe, Electronics Watch’s aim is to transform supply chain relationships
through the power of public buying, by employing innovative premises and tools.54
A. Leverage and Collaboration: the Afﬁliation Model
Electronic goods comprise a signiﬁcant portion of public purchases.55 These goods are
often high-value items and are procured in high volumes. Equally, contracts between
public buyers and suppliers tend to be relatively long compared with those between
suppliers themselves. Electronics Watch takes advantage of this by basing its model on
the leverage public buyers have with regard to their suppliers and a durable relationship
that allows for a sustained engagement between the parties. It is based on an afﬁliation
model. Public buyers afﬁliate, paying an annual fee proportional to their volume
of annual ICT hardware spending, to access Electronics Watch tools and instruments.
52 DG Arnold and LP Hartman, ‘Worker Rights and Low Wage Industrialization: How to Avoid Sweatshops’ (2006)
28 Human Rights Quarterly 676–700.
53 See, for example, Landmark Project, Success Stories in Socially Responsible Public Procurement. Using Public
Spending to Drive Improvements for Workers in Global Supply Chains, 2014, available at http://www.landmark-
project.eu/ﬁleadmin/ﬁles/en/LANDMARK_Success_Stories_2014_-_eng.pdf (accessed 1 December 2017).
54 Electronics Watch is the result of European Commission funded project from 2013 to 2015, led by the Spanish non-
governmental organization, SETEM. Other project partners included Centrum CSR (Poland), DanWatch (Denmark),
People and Planet (UK), SOMO (Netherlands), Südwind (Austria), and WEED (Germany). This consortium conducted
research on the electronics industry, developed model contract clauses, a code of labour standards, and other
procurement tools consistent with the EU procurement directive, developed dialogue and educational forums with
public sector buyers in their own regions, recruited 70 advisors and the ﬁrst afﬁliates to Electronics Watch. The project
ended in 2015 and Electronics Watch was incorporated under Dutch law and started conducting activities in its
own right.
55 There are no up-to-date ﬁgures on the amount of ICT hardware purchasing, but in 2002 it was estimated that by
2007 ICT procurement in the EU would amount to 94 billion Euros (European Union, Guidelines for Public
Procurement of ICT Goods and Services, 2012, 4, http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/ssai/docs/study-action23/d2-
ﬁnalreport-29feb2012.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017).
The instruments are, principally, a Code of Labour Practices, a set of model contract
clauses (Contract Conditions), Contractor Guidance, and most importantly, a network of
local monitors that develop factory monitoring and on-the-ground worker engagement.
The Electronics Watch model capitalizes on the power of collaboration among public
buyers. When public buyers consolidate their buying efforts, they are capable of
negotiating bigger contracts – through, for example, framework agreements, and
therefore have greater leverage over contractors. This way, public buyers may have more
direct economic power over their contracted suppliers. This power of collaboration and
engagement builds on a conﬂuence of common practices in domestic public buying, such
as purchasing consortia, and international practices of multi-stakeholder interaction,
which are common in corporate social responsibility and business and human rights
initiatives.56 The ultimate goal of this model is to transform supply chains through
creating sufﬁcient market demand via public purchasing practices for brands to engage in
supply chain improvement.
Similar initiatives exist in the United States, where as described above the inﬂuence of
large purchasers has been relied upon before. As mentioned previously, the WRC is an
independent monitoring organization that works with colleges and universities in the
United States to support them in their apparel-related licensing with the aim to avoid
sweatshop labour and defend workers’ rights in the supply chain of apparel.57 A notable
initiative is the Sweatfree Purchasing Consortium (SPC), established in 2010. It is a
membership organization of public entities; it has been created by these public entities to
manage procurement more efﬁciently and with less risk in human rights terms. It seeks
to avoid sweatshop practices in the supply chain of the products – mainly garments – its
members buy.58 The initiative is equally based upon recognition of the economic
inﬂuence of public procurement as a means of inﬂuencing working conditions in the
supply chain. However, its support for buyers is more policy based than Electronics
Watch. The SPC serves as a coordinating body and resource centre, providing its
members with a model purchasing agreement. Electronics Watch, by contrast, is a
monitoring organization, providing tools for engagement between workers, suppliers
and public buyers.
By including public buyers as agents of change, these organizations are seeking to
empower them to take responsibility over their own contribution to human rights abuses
in the supply chain, and challenging the assumptions that supply chains are too complex
for consumers – public buyers – to understand, inﬂuence and transform. It also confronts
the common reality of responsibility for improving worker human rights, beyond being
passed down the chain in a way that cannot be monitored or enforced, or solutions being
outsourced by simply commissioning auditing reports. Public sector organizations tend
to value social responsibility and sustainability and many have ethical policies in place
already. Taking some responsibility for the human rights of the workers who produce the
electronics products they buy is a new step.
56 Many of these multi-stakeholder initiatives include non-governmental organizations, business and governments.
Electronics Watch does not include businesses.
57 See http://www.workersrights.org/.
58 For further information, see the Consortium’s website at http://www.sweatfree.org/about_us.
The model relies on leverage: leverage from the public buyer to its contracted supplier
(retailer or directly the brand) and the contracted supplier towards its own subcontractor.
Leverage, in the context of corporate human rights violations, is deﬁned by the UNGPs
when articulating the corporate responsibility to respect, in particular when listing what
companies should do to prevent and mitigate human rights abuses.59 According to the
Commentary to UNGP 19, leverage can be considered ‘to exist where the enterprise has
the ability to affect change in the wrongful practices of an entity that causes the harm’.60
As Lukas has asserted, leverage is a measure ‘to assess what a company can do to support
human rights or end a human rights violation of an actor with regard to a certain power
proximity and relationship inﬂuence’.61 Applying this same concept to public buyers
implies considering what they can do to demand transparency from their suppliers and
inﬂuence their behaviour so in turn they do the same to their own suppliers. Leverage in
the context of business and human rights appears to have been originally directed to the
private sector, such that business would exercise leverage towards companies directly
linked to its operations, products or services by its business relationship. In fact, the
UNGPs do not refer to leverage when developing the state duty to protect.
Nevertheless, there is a strong argument to consider that the demand to exercise
leverage over those who they have direct business relationships also applies to public
authorities. In exercising it, they contribute to the fulﬁlment of their own duties with
regard to human rights protection. Electronics Watch envisages that public buyers would
be able to exercise leverage, by pooling resources designed to obtain reliable intelligence
about working conditions in the industry, engage with suppliers and ultimately create
effective market demand for decent working conditions in their ICT hardware supply
chains. Public buyers’ leverage is in turn used to promote contractor’s leverage from the
premise that leverage is not static for anyone, ‘It is a capacity that must be exercised, and,
through this exercise, strengthened’.62
The speciﬁc obligations assumed by Electronics Watch afﬁliates are: to pay an annual
fee, which is proportional to their ICT spending; to incorporate the Electronics Watch
59 UNGP 19: ‘In order to prevent and mitigate adverse human rights impacts, business enterprises should integrate the
ﬁndings from their impact assessments across relevant internal functions and processes, and take appropriate action:
[…] (b) Appropriate action will vary according to: (i) Whether the business enterprise causes or contributes to an
adverse impact, or whether it is involved solely because the impact is directly linked to its operations, products or
services by a business relationship; (ii) The extent of its leverage in addressing the adverse impact.”
60 According to the Commentary of UNGP 19, ‘Leverage may reﬂect one or more of a number of factors, such as: (a)
whether there is a degree of direct control between the enterprise and the supply chain entity; (b) the terms of contract
between the enterprise and supply chain entity; (c) the proportion of business the enterprise represents for the supply
chain entity; (d) the ability of the enterprise to incentivize the supply chain entity for improved human rights
performance in terms of future business, reputational advantage, capacity-building assistance etc.; (e) the reputational
beneﬁts for the supply chain entity of working with the enterprise, and the reputational harm of that relationship being
withdrawn; (f) the ability of the enterprise to engage other enterprises that work with the supply chain entity in
incentivizing improved human rights performance; (g) the ability of the enterprise to engage local or central government
in requiring improved human rights performance by the supply chain entity through implementation of regulations,
monitoring, sanctions, etc.’
61 Karin Lukas, ‘Human Rights in the Supply Chain: Inﬂuence and Accountability’ in Radu Mares (ed), The UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
2012).
62 Electronics Watch, Contractor Guidance for Electronics Watch Contract Conditions, version 1.1, September 2017,
available at http://electronicswatch.org/nl/the-electronics-watch-contractor-guidance_2525835 (accessed 25
September 2017).
Contract Conditions, or equivalent, into their ICT hardware contracts with new suppliers
or when contracts are renewed; and to nominate a point of contact in their organization.
These instruments are analysed below.
B. The Standards: Code of Labour Practices
The Electronics Watch Code of Labour Practices (the Code)63 reﬂects international legal
standards, as do most civil society codes. It has been drafted taking into account the
speciﬁcities of the industry.64 It contains a series of standards and sub-standards, based
on the fact that many international labour regulations lack the detail and speciﬁcity to
make standards. For each standard the Code contains a set of sub-standards that
describes speciﬁc practices that are prohibited.65 Electronic Watch guarantees that
standards in the Code are general enough that they capture the widest possible range of
human rights abuses but also speciﬁc enough to be easily interpreted and enforced.
In order to be compliant, electronics goods manufactured in the supply chain of the
companies that are bound by the Code (in a manner that will be explained in the next
section) must be produced under conditions that comply with all the standards contained
in the Code. This means, according to the Code itself: (a) where the standards relate to
the rights and conditions of workers, the workers must beneﬁt from all the rights and
conditions listed, and (b) where the standards relate to workplaces, the goods must be
produced in workplaces that meet all of the standards.66
Speciﬁcally, with regard to its content, the Code features provisions related to domestic
law, international labour law and a clause dealing with the potential contradiction between
the two. Firstly, contractors must comply with domestic labour law in the countries where
they produce goods or services and must ensure that their subcontractors do the same.
Contractors must also comply with the international labour standards and sub-standards
listed, which refer to the ILO Core Conventions (ILO Nos 29, 105, 87, 98, 100, 111, 138
and 182) as well as to ILO Conventions Nos 1, 95, 102, 115, 131, 135, 155, 158 and 170,
ILO Recommendations Nos 35 and 143, Article 34 of the ILO Tripartite Declaration of
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy and Article 32 of the
UnitedNations Convention on Rights of the Child. The core international labour standards
refer to: free choice of employment; freedom of association and the right to collective
bargaining; no discrimination in employment; and no exploitative child labour. Additional
international labour standards refer to: no excessive working hours; safe and healthy
working conditions; and no abusive termination of employment and living wages.
In the case of divergence between international and domestic standards, the Code
establishes that it would be the standard which provides greater protection to the worker
63 Electronics Watch Code of Labour Practices, available at http://electronicswatch.org/code-of-labour-
standards_2460399.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017).
64 The Code was developed by a Working Group including representatives from numerous human rights and labour
rights organizations, academics and practitioners. The author was part of this group.
65 These sub-standards condense the more than 300 compliance points developed by the ILO Better Work Programme
into a more manageable number of compliance points that serve as indicators of broad compliance.
66 Electronics Watch Code of Labour Practices, Introduction, note 64. The Code also deﬁnes the workers involved in
the production of goods for its purposes as any worker who has ‘any involvement, however slight, in the assembly of the
Goods or the production of the electrical components from which the Goods are assembled’.
that should prevail. A particularly problematic issue when drafting the Code appeared
regarding the issue of freedom of association, which is legally (as well as de facto)
restricted in several producing countries and which would directly provoke a divergence
of standards between applicable national law and international standards which afford
further protection to the worker. While the Code is clear that it does not require a
contractor or subcontractor to violate domestic law in a country of production, it also
demands contractors to honour international standards. Therefore, particularly with
regard to freedom of association the Code asks contractors to permit all activities
related to freedom of association that are not prohibited by domestic law, as well as
avoid practices that violate international standards unless a practice is mandated by
domestic law.67
As the Code was developed, another issue that arose was how to calculate living wage,
which took up a lot of time of the Model Working Group. Beyond the right of workers to
receive their legal wages, goods must be produced by workers who receive a living
wage.68 A living wage is a key concept when addressing workers’ rights in the supply
chain in general, and in the electronics industry, in particular, where, as described in the
ﬁrst section, overtime is inherent to the working conditions, given that basic salaries do
not cover the basic living needs of workers and their families. There have been numerous
attempts to deﬁne and calculate a living wage.69 The Electronics Watch Code provides
its own: a ‘living wage’ means a ‘take home’ or ‘net’ wage (excluding any taxes,
bonuses, allowances, or overtime wages) earned during a country’s legal maximum
work‐week (not exceeding 48 hours), which is sufﬁcient to pay for the basic needs
(housing, energy, nutrition, clothing, health care, education, potable water, childcare and
transportation) of a family of four people, and includes an additional 10% of the cost
of basic needs as discretionary income.70
C. Contract Performance Conditions: an Effective Due Diligence Model
As previously mentioned, one of the obligations assumed by afﬁliates is to incorporate a
model contract clause, the ‘Contract Conditions’, or equivalent, which establishes
contractor responsibility. Contractor responsibility is based on due diligence.71 One of
the main concerns during the drafting of the Contract Conditions was whether it meshed
with the existing EU procurement regulation. Traditionally, public contracting
authorities have been much freer to impose environmental and social conditions when
negotiating conditions governing how the contract with the supplier must be performed,
while they are relatively restricted from imposing such conditions in the other phases
of procurement (e.g., technical speciﬁcations and award criteria). Since contract
performance conditions apply after the contract has been awarded they do not impact the
67 Ibid, Standard 3.
68 Electronics Watch Code of Labour Standards, Standard 12, note 63.
69 See, for example, the work of the Global Living Wage Coalition to deﬁne and design a calculation methodology:
http://www.isealalliance.org/our-work/improving-effectiveness/global-living-wage-coalition (accessed 1 April 2017).
70 Electronics Watch Code of Labour Practices, Standard 12, note 63.
71 Martin-Ortega, Outhwaite and Rook, note 18. The Electronics Watch Model Working Group discussed several
options to include contractor obligation in the supply chain during the drafting process of the Contract Clauses,
including cascading clauses that needed to be inserted in every contract at every level of the supply chain.
assessment of tenders and therefore are less likely to cause problems related to the
principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency.
Contract performance conditions must relate to the execution of the contract, rather
than forming the basis of the award, and it is not necessary for tenderers to demonstrate
compliance prior to the award of the contract. EU regulations expressly state that those
conditions may include ‘economic, innovation-related, environmental, social or
employment-related considerations’ (Article 70, Directive 2014/24/EU), as long as
they relate to the subject matter of the contract.72 Thus the Contract Clauses take
advantage of the wider and more permissive rule that applies to contract performance
conditions over those applicable at earlier stages of the procurement process. Equally,
contract conditions apply to the duration of the contract, allowing for more sustained
engagement between the contracting authority and the contractor.
Amodel based on the introduction of contract performance conditions in public buyers–
contractor agreements speciﬁcally stays away from two popular models in corporate social
responsibility: the multi-stakeholder approach and the certiﬁcation scheme approach.
The multi-stakeholder approach requires the involvement of states, civil society and
industry representatives. Whilst these models are being used in several sectors, notably the
apparel sector, and they have their supporters, the multi-stakeholder path has not been
straightforward.73 Certiﬁcation schemes can form part of these multi-stakeholder
initiatives – such as the Kimberley Process for certiﬁcation of diamonds – or led by
civil society organizations or non-proﬁt enterprises, which demand the compliance of
companies with a set of standards. An example in the electronics industry is the Green
Electronics Council and TCODevelopment, which certify electronics products based on a
series of sustainability criteria.74 On other occasions non-governmental organizations
partner directly with corporations to guide their processes and monitoring of standards in
the production process (see section below for monitoring). There is also a proliﬁc practice
of corporations and industry associations themselves deﬁning standards and embedding
them in the supply chain legal framework by incorporating their own codes of conduct into
contracts with suppliers and subcontractors.75 An example of this is the Electronics
Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), recently re-branded as the Responsible Business
Alliance.
The Electronics Watch model involves a network of afﬁliated public sector buyers who
use the organization’s structure to create monitoring and compliance capacity. Companies
72 Article 70 establishes that contract performance conditions are permitted where related to the subject matter of the
contract within the broader meaning established in article 67(3), which deﬁnes what subject matter is in relation to award
criteria: ‘Award criteria shall be considered to be linked to the subject-matter of the public contract where they relate to
the works, supplies or services to be provided under that contract in any respect and at any stage of their life cycle’.
73 Dorothee Baumann-Pauly, Justine Nolan, Auret van Heerden and Michael Samway, ‘Industry-Speciﬁc Multi-
Stakeholder Initiatives that Govern Corporate Human Rights Standards – Legitimacy Assessments of the Fair Labor
Association and the Global Network Initiative’ (2015) 12 University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Legal Studies
Research Paper Series; Justine Nolan, ‘Reﬁning the Rules of the Game: The Corporate Responsibility to Respect
Human Rights’ (2014)Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 30–78; Scott Jerbi, ‘Assessing the Roles of
Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives in Advancing the Business and Human Rights Agenda’ (2013) 94 International Review of
the Red Cross, 887; Atabongawung Tamo, ‘New Thinking on Transnational Corporations and Human Rights: Towards
a Multi-Stakeholder Approach’ (2016) 34 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 147–73.
74 See http://greenelectronicscouncil.org/sustainable-solutions/epeat/ and http://tcodevelopment.com/sustainable-it/.
75 Anna Becks, Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility Codes (Oxford: Hart, 2015).
commit to legally binding obligations with regard to the rights of workers. These
obligations enter the supply chain through the introduction of the Contract Conditions as
part of the contract performance conditions in the contract between a public buyer and its
direct supplier, the brand or the retailer. Speciﬁcally, distancing itself from industry
involvement means that ‘Electronics Watch does not certify or rate products, factories, or
companies for compliance with labour rights and safety standards’.76 No company can
claim complete compliance in its supply chain, ‘[t]hus, the goal of any one contract for
electronics products is to detect breaches and help improve conditions for workers who
make the products’, rather than provide a company or its products with a stamp of approval.
A public procurement model that involves contractor due diligence is consistent with
the current tendency in the ﬁeld of business and human rights, an approach which
assumes an active role on the part of businesses to manage adverse human rights impacts
beyond considering them mere business risks.77 As per the UNGPs, corporate human
rights due diligence demands of corporations to have processes to identify, prevent,
mitigate and account for how they address their impact on human rights.78
The Contract Conditions are designed under this model and consistent with the
UNGPs, and the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises. The Contract
Conditions require the contractor to perform due diligence to ‘identify, prevent and
mitigate risk of breach, remedy actual breaches, and compensate workers affected by the
breaches’.79 It is arguable that they further contribute to the development of corporate
human rights due diligence by providing sectoral speciﬁc rules. Furthermore, they go
one step ahead by demanding ‘effective and accountable due diligence’.80 Contractors
are required to ‘achieve outcomes within [their] control, that is, outcomes [they] can
achieve without intervention by another actor. If a contractor does not achieve this
speciﬁc outcome, and they are not within the contractor’s control, the contractor must
comply with its contractual obligations by exercising and demonstrating effective due
diligence’ [added emphasis].81 The compliance with these obligations is based on a
model of ‘comply or explain’, which allows to aim for behaviour change and systemic
improvements while still allowing ﬂexibility and evolution.82 However, this is also a sort
of due diligence plus as it moves away from the obligation of process established by the
international soft-law instruments mentioned and some of the current national legislation
76 Electronics Watch Contract Conditions, http://electronicswatch.org/en/the-electronics-watch-contract-conditions_
2459984 (accessed 1 April 2017).
77 Robert McCorquodale, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and International Human Rights Law’ (2009) 87 Journal
of Business Ethics 392; Olga Martin-Ortega, ‘Human Rights Due Diligence for Corporations: form Voluntary Standards
to Hard Law at Last?’ (2014) 32 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 49–50; Robert McCorquodale, Lise Smit,
Stuart Neely and Robin Brooks, ‘Human Rights Due Diligence in Law and Practice: Good Practices and Challenges for
Business Enterprises’ (2017) 2 Business and Human Rights Journal 198.
78 UNGP 15. The OECD Guidelines on Multinational Corporations follow the UNGPs in the deﬁnition of corporate
human rights due diligence.
79 Electronics Watch Contract Conditions, note 76.
80 Electronics Watch, Contractor Guidance note 53. The Contractor Guidance has been developed in consultation
with over 25 organizations, including afﬁliates, reseller and brand companies as well as human rights and health and
safety experts and labour rights organizations. They have been endorsed by civil society organizations and public buyers
and academics including Radu Mares and Robert Stumberg.
81 Electronics Watch, Contractor Guidance note 62, p 11.
82 Radu Mares, Endorsement of Electronics Watch Contract Clauses, available at http://electronicswatch.org/en/the-
electronics-watch-contractor-guidance_2525835 (accessed 25 September 2017).
that establishes due diligence-related obligations (transparency and reporting), such as
Section 1502 of the 2010 US Dodd Frank Act and the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act, to
an obligation of result. This is in line with new normative developments, mainly
represented by the 2017 French Duty of Vigilance Law, which focus on the effectiveness
of due diligence measures and attach consequences to the lack of adoption of such
measures or their inadequacy to prevent human rights violations.83
Relying on a model of due diligence provides the necessary ﬂexibility to allow a
progressive process of responsibility and supplier engagement, from disclosure to
establishing a clear obligation of result (effective due diligence measured against
detailed benchmarks). This goes beyond current corporate human rights due diligence
practice. The challenge is to articulate this ﬂexibility in practice whilst at the same time
being able to deﬁne speciﬁcally how the compliance with the obligation to exercise
effective due diligence is measured.
The Contract Conditions rely on the concept of leverage, discussed in the previous
section. The contractor needs to exercise leverage to perform its responsibilities to
achieve compliance with the Code of Labour Practices. Flexibility is also needed based
on the recognition that the contractor in the public procurement agreement may be a
brand, with relatively more control over the supply chain, or a reseller with less leverage.
Both types of companies are capable of complying with the Electronics Watch Contract
Conditions. With regard to how to measure due diligence compliance, the Contract
Conditions establish that contractors are responsible for due diligence to ensure socially
responsible trading conditions in the supply chain: that is, pricing and delivery terms that
ensure compliance with labour rights and safety standards is feasible.84 Therefore, the
Contract Conditions contribute to operationalize the broad concept of corporate human
rights due diligence and provide it with speciﬁc meaning in the context of the industry.
This is an important practice that so far has been developed in very few sectors.85
The speciﬁc obligations acquired by the contractors in their exercise of due diligence
have been further deﬁned in the Contractor Guidance, which was published in 2017.
The Contractor Guidance contains eleven outcomes that should be achieved by the
contractors in speciﬁc timeframes. These are outcomes regarding: factories and products
transparency, materials transparency, compliance data transparency, transparency regarding
trading conditions, factory cooperation and factory compliance with ElectronicsWatch Code
Labour Practices.
Where Electronics Watch identiﬁes unsatisfactory performance, e.g., failure to
exercise leverage to address breaches of the Code, it can engage with contractors, on
behalf of afﬁliates, to achieve compliance. As a last resort, afﬁliates can decide to use
contractual sanctions to obtain remedy, as is analysed in the next section. The Contract
83 See in particular, Sandra Cossart, Jerome Chaplier and Tiphaine Beau de Lomenie, ‘The French Law on Duty of
Care: A Historic Step Towards Making Globalization Work for All’ (2017), 2 Business and Human Rights Journal,
317–23.
84 See publicly available information on the Electronics Watch website: http://electronicswatch.org/en/the-
electronics-watch-contract-conditions_2459984 (accessed 1 April 2017).
85 The OECD has provided detailed guidance on how to articulate corporate due diligence in other sections of the
supply chain, e.g., with regard to the extraction of tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold, but so far this remains one of the
most pressing challenges in the development of standards and practice regarding the corporate responsibility to respect
human rights. See http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/mining.htm (accessed 1 April 2017).
Conditions have started to be inserted in new procurement contracts. The ﬁrst one was
the UK Higher Education and National Apple Equipment and Services Framework
Agreement, in April 2016.86 Following this agreement several UK universities have
included the Contract Conditions within their individual contracts with suppliers within
this Framework Agreement. As of August 2017, seven contracts have included the
Contract Clauses across Europe.87 This has allowed the engagement with contractors but
also called the attention of brands. In addition, four brands are currently engaged in
factory compliance.88
D. Monitoring Supply Chains: a New Model of Worker-Driven Monitoring
To verify compliance, Electronics Watch monitors factories that contractors have
disclosed in accordance with their obligations under the Contract Conditions. Having
access to reliable monitoring of their supply chain is one of the main values added for
public buyers afﬁliated to ElectronicsWatch. However, at the same time this is one of the
most challenging elements of the model: how can contractors and public contracting
agencies guarantee reliable monitoring that provides a set of veriﬁable data to act upon?
Public buyers have not traditionally considered the monitoring of their supply chain as
part of their responsibility and it is highly likely that they do not have the resources to
undertake this role directly.
In 2003, Michael Santoro warned of the limitations of compliance-oriented human
rights policies, including codes of conducts and monitoring.89 As he asserted, while
codes and monitoring can lead a company to determine how well or poorly its
manufacturing facilities are in terms of human rights, they cannot per se ‘ﬁx the
problems they uncover’.90 Since, and more signiﬁcantly since the Rana Plaza disaster,
monitoring compliance through social auditing has been discredited as being
questionable in terms of independence and effectiveness, unable to bring to light some
of the most ﬂagrant violations of workers’ rights.91 Furthermore, as Lukas notes, audits
have been mostly concerned with health and safety issues and paid less attention to
wages, overtime and trade union rights, which are critical for the improvement of
working conditions.92 In fact, a salient criticism over current monitoring and social
auditing is that they rarely include workers and trade unions as part of their processes.
Monitoring has mostly been led by corporations or third parties hired from auditing
86 See http://electronicswatch.org/the-uk-higher-education-and-national-apple-equipment-and-services-framework-
agreement_2455571.pdf. This Framework Agreement had been signed with four suppliers, not including Apple.
87 Electronics Watch Impact and Project Results at a Glance, 1 August 2017 (on ﬁle with the author).
88 Ibid.
89 Michael Santoro, ‘Beyond Codes of Conduct and Monitoring: An Organizational Integrity Approach to Global
Labor Practices’ (2003), 25 Human Rights Quarterly 407–24.
90 Ibid. The author provides an interesting simile: ‘while codes of conduct and monitoring systems can uncover human
rights problems, they are not, in and of themselves, solutions to these problems. Just as ﬁnancial accounting can’t
generate proﬁts, monitoring factories can’t generate good conditions. In each case, the process can only help us to
determine whether or not ﬁnancial or social objectives are being met.’
91 Genevieve Le Baron, Jane Lister and Peter Dauvergne, ‘Governing Global Supply Chain Sustainability through the
Ethical Audit Regime’ (2017), 14 Globalizations 958–75.
92 Lukas, note 61, 161. As the author says, improvements suggested in these kind of audits – such as better lighting,
ventilation, etc. – ‘relate to processes upgrading as they also increase productivity by a more “efﬁcient” use of the
“human resource”’.
ﬁrms to industry association and industry-backed initiatives, to ensure compliance of
voluntary standards. These processes have tended to ‘deliver for management and
corporations, but not for the workers they claim to beneﬁt’.93
Over a decade ago some companies claimed to have adopted a ‘beyond monitoring’
approach, based on capacity building and dialogue with suppliers rather than top-down
control to ensure compliance.94 However, it is arguable that no signiﬁcant change has
been brought to workers in global supply chains. Alternative systems of monitoring and
auditing of factories and labour conditions need to be found, especially initiatives that
place workers at the heart of the process, rather than mechanical compliance with
company or industry standards.
Electronics Watch has explicitly avoided the social auditing model and steered away
from the limitations of this kind of externally led monitoring by relying on a network of
local monitoring organizations to develop ‘worker-driven monitoring’.95 While external
third party auditors tend to move quickly in and out of factories and only get partial
pictures of the reality, local workers’ rights associations and civil society organizations
understand the reality of the country, industry and factory. They have the rapport and
trust to provide signiﬁcant engagement with workers. This type of monitoring has at its
core the goal of strengthening workers’ voices so that they are able to report on and
address safety and labour issues on their own or in collaboration with the companies,
rather than having externally based, and/or imposed processes of monitoring and supply
chain reform. The premise is that workers are the best monitors as they are on site all day,
every day. They know the process and problems of normal operations; they have ideas
for resolving safety and labour rights problems; and they can verify whether corrections
are implemented and actually work. In this monitoring model, workers are active; they
bring attention to issues and can set in motion investigations and remedial activities.96
A signiﬁcant challenge to the implementation of the Electronics Watch model is
therefore establishing this network of local monitors, who are qualiﬁed local civil society
organizations, able to undertake continuous intelligence gathering and at the same time
maintain trusted relationships with workers.97 A relevant criterion for the selection,
beyond their expertise and independence from the industry, should be that they have
ongoing relationships of trust with workers in electronics factories. This is important as
they must be able to meet with them in safe settings where workers can share information
about workplace hazards and rights violations without fearing employer retaliation.98
93 AFL-CIO, Responsibility Outsourced: Social Audits, Workplace Certiﬁcation, and Twenty Years of Failure to
Protect Worker Rights, 2013, http://www.aﬂcio.org/content/download/77061/1902391/CSReport.pdf (accessed 1
April 2017).
94 Business for Social Responsibility, Beyond Monitoring: A New Vision for Sustainable Supply Chains, 2007, https://
www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/report-view/beyond-monitoring-a-new-vision-for-sustainable-supply-chain (accessed 1
April 2017); Richard Locke, Q Fei and A Brause, ‘Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards? Lessons from Nike’
(2007), 61 ILRREVIEW 3–33.
95 Electronics Watch Worker Driven Monitoring, http://electronicswatch.org/en/worker-driven-monitoring_2460012
(accessed 1 December 2017).
96 Ibid. The models of worker-centred or worker-driven monitoring are still being tested and deﬁned, so is speciﬁc
methodology to guarantee not only a better representation of workers in the monitoring process but their own capacity to
be the drivers of such a process. Both practice and research on it is lacking and urgently needed.
97 Ibid, and Business, Human Rights and the Environment and International Labour Rights Forum, Report on Worker
Driven Monitoring in the Electronics Industry (Hong Kong, April 2017) (2018, in press, on ﬁle with the author).
The close relationship of monitors with workers enables these local organizations to
detect and understand hard-to-measure violations, such as union repression and
discrimination, and vulnerability to other violations such as forced labour and human
trafﬁcking. In theory, these kinds of local monitors would be able to react quickly to
issues that must be addressed promptly and to stay engaged over a long period of time,
when needed, to oversee the process of remedying long-term violations and achieving
sustainable compliance.99 Electronics Watch has so far engaged local groups in China,
Mexico, India, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Czech Republic.100 Through
these organizations it is able to undertake both regional risk assessments and factory
compliance investigations. So far, this has led to three regional risk assessments and ﬁve
factory reports.101 All reports are available to afﬁliates.
E. Remediation and Supply Chain Reform
The main goal of a labour and human rights standard setting and monitoring system is to
improve the working and living conditions of those working in supply chains.
Remediation of speciﬁc violations is essential and so is reform of conditions that result in
such violations. As discussed in the previous section, a common criticism of current
monitoring processes is that they do not serve as a basis for remediation of the situation
of abuse of workers’ rights, nor do they facilitate reparation processes. Even if speciﬁc
instances get resolved, problems tend to resurface and ultimately auditing and
monitoring do not lead to supply chain reform. In line with the UNGPs, mechanisms
for remediation are needed when human rights violations occur in corporate
environments. Such mechanisms should ideally provide a means by which all relevant
parties, including supply chain employees, sub-contractors, the contracted supplier and
the consumer – in our analysis, the public buyer – can raise issues and seek resolution
and remedies.
The Electronics Watch Contract Conditions allow contracting authorities to employ
enforcement actions that not only guarantee contractual compliance by the supplier but
ultimately seek to enable the address of speciﬁc and endemic problems in the factories
monitored. These enforcement actions can be applied gradually, as needed, beginning
with informal engagement proceeding to escalation procedures and, as last resort,
sanctions. Termination of contracts may not be the most effective tool, as the public
buyer would probably lose all leverage over the contractor and its supply chain.
All Electronics Watch monitoring reports contain speciﬁc actions recommended for
afﬁliates, ranging from raising ‘Worker Rights Alerts’ to their contractors demanding
compliance plans from them to address the risk identiﬁed by monitors within 30 days.
Worker Rights Alerts are based on in-person worker complaints, hotline reports, and
other forms of worker testimonies. These reports identify actual or potential violations of
the Electronics Watch Code of Labour Practices in any of the disclosed factories, and
98 Electronics Watch Worker Driven Monitoring, note 95.
99 See, for example, Electronics Watch, Electronics Watch Monitoring and Reform Programmes, 2015, http://
electronicswatch.org/monitoring-and-reform_98120.pdf (accessed 1 April 2017), p. 4.
100 Ibid.
101 Electronics Watch Impact and Project Results at a Glance note 87.
recommends steps that factories, contractors, or brands should take to mitigate and
prevent risks of violations. Afﬁliates can use these reports in contractor engagement
either to ensure the contractors address the issues adequately in their compliance plans,
or, if the issue is not remedied, use escalation or enforcement actions as necessary to
ensure corrective action. For example, in July 2016 Electronics Watch recommended
afﬁliates to raise worker rights alerts to contractors providing a series of brands
supplying from a speciﬁc factory in the Philippines.102
Corrective action plans are based on the extensive evidence gathered through off-site
worker interviews, interviews with factory management and supervisors, review of
factory personnel records and other factory documents. The reports present conclusive
ﬁndings regarding the potential violations identiﬁed in the risk analyses or in related
allegations or complaints. If Electronics Watch ﬁnds breaches of the Electronics Watch
Code of Labour Practices, a corrective action plan is recommended for the factory and
the organization would work with the factory management, workers and their
representatives, the contractor, and the brand company as necessary, to implement the
steps needed to correct the violations.
Afﬁliates can use these reports and updates on the corrective action plans to hold the
contractor accountable for any failure to address contract breaches, and use escalation or
enforcement actions as necessary. For example, in September 2016 Electronics Watch
recommended afﬁliates whose contractors provided a speciﬁc brand sourcing from the
Czech Republic to demand a compliance plan including both short-term and long-term
actions, to address all areas of risk identiﬁed, which ranged from discrimination, freedom
of association, work contracts, working hours, wage payments, housing and
transportation and speciﬁc concerns regarding migrant workers.103
In general, providing evidence of impact, beyond remediation of individual violations,
and measuring the capacity of factory monitoring on structural changes over working
conditions is very difﬁcult.104 So far the activity of Electronics Watch has provided
evidence of collaboration between public buyers, its contractors and brands in the sector
which shows a considerable potential of public buyers’ leverage on the industry. The
organization measures its impact to date as improvements in ﬁve factories, beneﬁting
more than 50,000 workers and the improvement of supply chain transparency by three
brands as the direct response of afﬁliates’ requirements.105 For example, there was a
sustained two-year engagement between Swedish County Councils with the brand Dell,
who was an IT provider to the Councils. The Swedish Councils’ intervention included
declaring a standstill on additional purchases of Dell products, which amounted to a
de facto termination of the contract. This led to the design of speciﬁc transparency and
due diligence procedures in order to address concerns over labour rights and safety issues
in certain factories in China. In 2016, the UK purchasing organization London
Universities Purchasing Consortium (LUPC) and others successfully engaged with a
102 This report is only available to the afﬁliates – on ﬁle with the author.
103 This report is only available to the afﬁliates – on ﬁle with the author. At the time of writing afﬁliates were still
engaged in taking these measures.
104 For example, Locke, note 2.
105 Electronics Watch Impact and Project Results at a Glance, note 87.
series of electronics brands to end a practice of forced student labour in factories
providing servers to such brands.106
V. CONCLUSION
This article has argued for the potential for capitalizing on the signiﬁcant leverage that
public buyers have over corporate practices in the supply chain and to serve as a tool to
promote respect and protection of human rights. The Electronics Watch initiative
provides an innovative example of practices that bring state purchasing to the centre of
the state obligation to protect the human rights of those who produce their products.
Through this model the economic leverage of public buyers can be articulated into a
transformative tool for working conditions in global supply chains. It is rapidly
consolidating through the inclusion its Contract Conditions in several European ICT
procurement contracts, which means that suppliers are assuming contractual
commitments to exercise due diligence over their supply chain and engage in
remediation when breaches have been identiﬁed. Local monitoring organizations that
integrate its network are in place and reporting on working conditions and supplier
compliance with international and national standards specially tailored to the electronics
industry. Buyers, suppliers and brands are collaborating to ﬁnd solutions in speciﬁc
factories but also to establish better practices in the industry. The ethos of Electronics
Watch is to serve as an instrument of supply chain transformation and therefore facilitate
supply chain reform. This alliance, between civil society and public buyers, is based on
multi-stakeholder actor engagement but is ﬁrmly anchored in the legal responsibility that
contractual clauses bring. It revolves around the deﬁnition of human rights due diligence
as a measurable process: an effective process that has the capacity to bring about positive
change to the industry and its supply chain practices, ultimately contributing to the
improvement of life and working conditions of those who produce the goods we buy.
The infrastructure to do this has been set up, and further implementation of the
Electronics Watch Labour Code and Contract Conditions, and evaluation of the impacts
of such activity, is now needed to validate this model, both for this speciﬁc industry and
for supply chains more widely.
106 LUPC’s action was prompted by the Danwatch investigation into the factory of the company Wistron
Corporation in Zhongshan (China), Danwatch, 2015, note 26. The case study of this collaboration is conﬁdential and not
openly available (on ﬁle with the author). LUPC used Electronics Watch reports and recommendations in their
engagement with the factory and the brands.
